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Pablo Picasso’s Les femmes des Algers sold for a record-shattering 
$179,365,000 at a Christie’s auction in May 2015.1  Although this sale made Les 
femmes des Algers the most expensive painting of all time, its record will no 
doubt be broken in the future.  Buying and selling art has long been seen as a 
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2017; B.A. in History of Art, 
B.A. in Economics, Indiana University, 2014.  I would like to thank Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell for 
her thoughtful and invaluable guidance throughout the writing process.  I am also exceedingly grateful for 
her mentorship on the subjects of art and international law more generally.  I also thank my family and 
friends for their kindness and support. 
1 Shane Hickey, Picasso Painting Breaks the Record for the Most Expensive Artwork Sold at Auction, 
THE GUARDIAN (May 12, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2015/may/12/pablo-picasso-
work-sets-record-for-most-expensive-artwork-sold-at-auction. 
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hobby of the wealthy, and though the market can be volatile, pieces highly 
regarded by critics generally continue to appreciate in perpetuity.2 
It should come as no surprise that the art game was alive and well in the 
nineteenth century. French artist Jean-Francois Millet remains a giant in art 
history today, known for his works featuring peasant farmers and his role in both 
the Realism and Barbizon art movements.  His work, however, was not greeted 
by contemporaries with the enthusiasm it garners today.3  One of his most striking 
paintings, L’Angelus, features the figures of two peasants working in a field, 
heads both bowed in prayer.  L’Angelus initially sold for a paltry 1,000 francs in 
1860, but by the end of the nineteenth-century, works by Barbizon school painters 
had become quite en vogue.  In 1889, fourteen years after Millet’s death, 
L’Angelus sold at auction for 553,000 francs.4  For the time, it was the most 
expensive painting ever sold. 
Yet, Millet’s family, “completely destitute at the time,” never saw a penny 
from this sale.5  The families of preeminent post-Impressionists Paul Cézanne and 
Paul Gauguin suffered similar fates, drawing the attention of the French 
government.6  Their plight exposed the fundamental problem of the art market:  
An artist is entitled to earnings only from the initial sale of his work.  Art tends to 
appreciate over time, and frequently changes hands, but market structure prevents 
any of this from trickling back to the artist or his family.  Thus, in 1920, France 
became the first country to introduce a legal remedy for this problem—droit de 
suite, the moral right of an artist to receive resale royalties for his work.7 
A new treaty whose aim is to impose universal baselines for artist resale 
royalty rights could significantly address the unevenness of the international art 
market, increasing its transparency and improving the plight of the artist.  Part I 
will examine the development of droit de suite.  Part II will look to recent 
implementations of royalty schemes for insights into the process.  Part III will 
explore the two biggest outliers, the United States and China.  Part IV will 
investigate the impacts of royalty schemes and their disparate application on the 
international art market.  And finally, Part V will discuss and suggest possible 







2 Abigail R. Esman, Ten Expert Tips for Investing in the Art Market, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/abigailesman/2012/03/26/ten-expert-tips-for-investing-in-the-art-market//.  
3 Bradley Fratello, France Embraces Millet: The Intertwined Fates of The Gleaners and The Angelus, 
MUTUALART (Dec. 2003), http://www.mutualart.com/OpenArticle/France-Embraces-Millet--The-
Intertwined-/65DB908A334354D8. 
4 Id. 
5 Tiernan Morgan & Lauren Purje, An Illustrated Guide to Artist Resale Royalties (aka ‘Droit de 
Suite’), HYPERALLERGIC (Oct. 24, 2014), http://hyperallergic.com/153681/an-illustrated-guide-to-artist-
resale-royalties-aka-droit-de-suite/. 
6 Alexander Bussey, The Incompatibility of Droit de Suite with Common Law Theories of Copyright, 
23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.1063, 1068 (2013). 
7 Morgan & Purje, supra note 5. 
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF DROIT DE SUITE 
 
 
The image of artists dying “in misery at a time when their paintings were 
bringing enormous sums”8 proved politically salient in nineteenth-century France.  
Its passage of the first droit de suite law was quickly followed by Belgium in 
1921 and Czechoslovakia in 1926.9  The artist's right to receive royalties for 
subsequent sales of their works was deemed inalienable, unwaivable, and 
nonassignable.10  That is to say, the right is a moral one:  “[T]he artist cannot sell 
works that are free of the obligation to pay a resale royalty,” and “the right to 
collect resale royalties in a given work cannot be transferred by the artist to 
another person.”11  Droit de suite has also been defended as both an economic 
right and an extension of the personhood theory of copyright, “which suggests 
that the creator of a work never really gives up all of the property interests in the 
work, as it is actually a part of the creator’s personhood.”12 
 The reasoning comes from an unavoidable distinction between visual artists 
and other types of artists:  “[U]nlike writers, filmmakers, and musicians, artists 
don't benefit from derivative or reproducible income (such as screenplay rights or 
soundtrack licensing). . . . This is because the art industry places a massive 
premium on uniqueness.”13  This “premium on uniqueness” is a double-edged 
sword; visual artists cannot benefit from derivatives or reproductions, but their 
work does tend to enjoy appreciation in value more so than that of other artists.  
Again, this tendency highlights the resale problem:  Without droit de suite, artists 
are prevented from benefitting whatsoever from the rising value of their work.  
Furthermore, artists cannot simply sit on their work waiting for it to appreciate, 
either.  The art market is too volatile to predict when or to what extent a piece 
may rise in value, if it does so at all, and without exposure to the public, dealers, 
and others, it may never garner enough attention to gain much value at all. 
Enough countries were persuaded by France’s reasoning that in 1948, the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works was amended 
to include the moral right of the artist to receive resale royalties.  This amendment 
did not make droit de suite mandatory, however.14  Although the idea was 
attractive, countries were slow to actually implement it in their own legislation.15  
The formulation of droit de suite statutes naturally varies from country to 
country, but its fundamental components look largely the same.  A typical case 
might proceed as follows:  An artist produces a painting and sells it to a dealer for 
$100.  That dealer then sells it for $500 to a private collector.  Years later, that 
private collector sells it for $10,000 to a museum.  Without droit de suite, the 
 
8 Stephanie B. Turner, The Artist’s Resale Royalty Right: Overcoming the Information Problem, 19 
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 329, 335 (2012). 
9 Morgan & Purje, supra note 5. 
10 Turner, supra note 8, at 336. 
11 Id. 
12 Bussey, supra note 6, at 1066–67. 
13 Morgan & Purje, supra note 5. 
14 Bussey, supra note 6, at 1069. 
15 Id. 
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artist receives $100 for work that he produced, and the story ends there.  With a 
droit de suite statute, however, the story might end a little differently.  Say the 
statute provides that, for every sale of a piece of art valuing $500 or more, the 
artist is entitled to a five percent resale royalty.  Thus, for the dealer’s sale to the 
private collector, the artist would receive a $25 royalty.  And years later, the artist 
(should he survive) or his estate would be entitled to receive a $500 royalty. 
Such a system makes sense considering the intellectual property right of a 
work—the copyright—is usually inherited and thus retained by the artist’s family 
(subject, of course, to the limits of copyright law—eventually the work will enter 
the public domain).16  The resale royalty system merely allows the artist or his 
estate to reap the financial benefits attached to the work.  In modern formulations, 
droit de suite statutes typically apply only to public sales, such as those through 
auction houses or professional dealers, and usually impose a three to seven 
percent resale royalty rate.17 
 
 
II. CURRENT STATUS OF ARTIST RESALE ROYALTY LAWS 
 
A. Droit de Suite in the European Union 
 
Leading the pack in artist resale royalty laws is the European Union, which in 
2001 implemented the Artist Rights Directive (“the Directive”).18  The Directive 
declared that “[i]n the field of copyright, the resale right is an unassailable and 
inalienable right, enjoyed by the author of an original work of graphic or plastic 
art, to an economic interest in successive sales of the work concerned.”19  It 
mandated several specific policies:  Member states were permitted to set their 
own minimum prices which would trigger the resale liability, but such minimum 
price could not exceed 3,000€.20  If a member state set the minimum at a price 
less than 3,000€, the member state could not set the royalty rate at anything less 
than four percent up to that 3,000€ threshold.21  To clarify by example, say 
member state X set the minimum price at which the resale rate was triggered at 
2,000€.  This satisfies the Directive's threshold requirements.  That means any 
secondary sale of art in the price range of 2,000–3,000€ is entitled to a four 
percent royalty for the artist. Currently, member states have set their minimums at 
various amounts, ranging from Germany at 400€ and France at 750€ to Austria at 
the maximum 3,000€.22 
 
16 RIGHTS & REPRODUCTIONS: THE HANDBOOK FOR CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS 26 (Anne M. Young, 
ed., 2015) [hereinafter RIGHTS & REPRODUCTIONS HANDBOOK]. 
17 Morgan & Purje, supra note 5. 
18 Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the 
Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an Original Work of Art, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32–36, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32001L0084 [hereinafter Directive 2001/84/EC]. 
19 Id. pmbl. 
20 Id. ch. II, art. 3. 
21 Id. ch. II, art. 4. 
22 The Resale Rights Directive, VG BILD-KUNST, http://www.bildkunst.de/en/copyright/resale-
right/resale-right-in-the-european-union.html. 
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The Directive also established a sliding rate scale, capping the total amount 
of the royalty from any resale at 12,500€.23  A four percent royalty rate would 
apply for sale prices up to 50,000€, three percent for sales between 50,000.01 and 
200,000€, one percent for sales between 200,000.01 and 350,000€, 0.5% for sales 
between 350,000.01 and 500,000€, and 0.25% for sales exceeding 500,000€.24  
These sale prices are considered net of tax.25  Member states were also permitted 
to apply a five percent royalty rate for sales up to 50,000€ should they so 
choose.26 
The Directive was not binding upon all member states upon its adoption in 
2001.  It included a provision granting "a generous transitional period," allowing 
member states until 2005 to fully implement it.27  Additional extensions were 
allowed, and there was a struggle to include a reluctant United Kingdom, but as 
of 2012 “the resale right has been fully harmonized across the European Union, 
i.e. indiscriminately vesting artists and their heirs with such rights.”28  
The United Kingdom’s 2016 referendum to exit the European Union may 
prove to undermine these harmonization efforts.  Many see it as an opportunity to 
“eliminate or reduce the regulatory burdens that have piled up in recent decades, 
adding costs and compromising London’s competitive position against its 
principal rivals:  New York, Hong Kong, and Switzerland’s art trade centres.”29  
Such speculation, however, is merely that—speculation.  The United Kingdom 
(U.K.) “ranked second in the global art market last year, behind the United States 
and slightly ahead of China.”30  Although the U.K.’s market share has fallen, this 
trend exists over the last decade31—suggesting that the source of this decline is 
not a direct result of harmonization with the Directive.  The full impact of the 
U.K.’s exit from the European Union (E.U.) on the art market (and on the 
survival of its resale royalty right) is, therefore, unclear. 
One general criticism of the right that still persists to an extent is the “cascade 
effect.”  The Directive attempted to preclude this issue by recommending the 
elimination of differences between various countries’ resale laws “where they 
have a distorting effect on the functioning of the internal market.”32  It addressed 
the cascade effect by mandating that the resale royalty “shall be payable by the 
seller.”33  The cascade effect appears where dealers take advantage of different 
resale laws in different countries to avoid paying any resale royalty, or, 
alternatively, get stuck paying the royalty twice.34  This occurs because some 
 
23 Directive 2001/84/EC, supra note 18, ch. II, art. 4. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. ch. II, art. 5. 
26 Id. ch. II, art. 4. 
27 The Resale Rights Directive, supra note 22. 
28 Id. 




32 Directive 2001/84/EC, supra note 18, pmbl. 
33 Id. ch. I, art. 1. 
34 EUROPEAN COMM’N, KEY PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THE 
AUTHOR RESALE RIGHT 1 (Feb. 17, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/resale/ 
140214-resale-right-key-principles-and-recommendations_en.pdf. 
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countries made the resale royalty payable to the artist by the seller, but others 
made it payable by the buyer.  Thus, a dealer could buy at an auction in a country 
where the seller pays the royalty.  The dealer would be the buyer in this 
transaction, and therefore owe no royalty.  Then, the dealer could sell at an 
auction in a country where the buyer pays the royalty.  In this transaction, the 
dealer would be the seller, and therefore owe no royalty.  In this way, savvy art 
dealers are able to evade royalty liability entirely.  Conversely, an unfortunate or 
not-so-savvy dealer could buy at an auction in a country where the buyer pays the 
royalty, then sell at an auction in a country where the seller pays the royalty—
paying it twice. 
Regardless of the Directive’s “seller pays” provision, the cascade effect 
problem was not ameliorated or eliminated due to the contractual freedom that 
exists between the various players in the art market.35  For example, auction 
houses might stipulate in a contract with a private buyer that the buyer will be 
charged the value of the resale royalty—so although the seller still pays, the 
money comes from the buyer’s pocket, allowing the cascade effect to persist.  
One of the several reports spawned by the Directive, the Key Principles and 
Recommendations on the Management of the Author Resale Right, was signed in 
2014 by seventeen collective management organizations (CMOs); auctions 
houses, art dealers, and galleries (AMPs); and trade associations.36  This report 
recommended guidelines for transparency, sharing of information, and 
cooperation between the different players in the art market, including the CMOs, 
AMPs, and trade associations.37  The signatories agreed to gather more data to 
determine the pervasiveness of the problem and agreed to address it in a report set 
to be published late 2015.38 
The problem of the cascade effect demonstrates, however, the extent to which 
droit de suite has been accepted as a fundamental right in the E.U.  Criticisms and 
improvements have not been focused on the right of the artist itself, but rather on 
its impact and how to make it most effective.  Thus the E.U. and its Directive 
represent one of the most extensive case studies of implementation of droit de 
suite. 
 
B. Droit de Suite in Australia 
 
Like the E.U., Australia has also implemented a droit de suite scheme. 
Australia passed the Resale Royalty Right for Visual Artists Act 2009 (“Act 
2009”), which took effect June 9, 2010.  Its terms are similar to those of the E.U. 
Directive, stipulating that “artists receive five percent of the sale price when 
eligible artworks are resold commercially for $1000 or more.”39  The Act 2009 






39 Resale Royalty Scheme, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS AND THE 
ARTS, http://arts.gov.au/visual-arts/resale-royalty-scheme (last visited Oct. 14, 2015). 
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artist's death."40  Its stated objectives are “to provide visual artists with: (1) 
recognition of their ongoing rights in their art, and (2) additional income through 
royalties derived from commercial resales of their art.”41  Thus, the Act 2009 
aligns with both the personhood theory of copyright and the notion of droit de 
suite as an economic right. 
Australia originally set out to address the problem in 2002, when the Report 
of the Contemporary Visual Arts and Craft Inquiry (“Myer Report”) found “that 
the incomes of contemporary visual artists and craft practitioners in Australia 
[were] lower than that of the general workforce, and of artists in other fields.”42  
Further impetus to establish a royalty scheme came from concern for Australia’s 
indigenous peoples. The Myer Report noted: 
 
[T]he disadvantaged position of Indigenous visual arts and crafts 
practitioners in the market, and the extensive financial and social 
obligations of indigenous artists to the community arising from 
communal ownership of cultural property and traditional 
imagery, has strengthened the call for the introduction of resale 
royalties in Australia as a tool for increasing the income of 
indigenous artists.43 
 
The development of droit de suite in Australia thus provides a compelling 
contrast to the development of droit de suite in Europe. Harmonizing resale laws 
across all of Europe drew its urgency from the difficulties of managing an 
economic market spread among many countries. Australia's resale laws were an 
outgrowth of concern for its domestic market. Thus, considering the two 
examples together suggests that there are vital reasons, both external and internal, 
for countries to impose royalty schemes. 
 
C. Droit de Suite in Canada 
 
Canada, though a signatory of Article 14 of the Berne Convention 
recognizing the inalienable right of the artists to benefit from the resale of his 
work, does not currently have its own royalty scheme.44  Two private groups, the 
Canadian Artists’ Representation/Le Front des artistes canadiens (CARFAC) and 
the Regroupement des Artistes en arts visuels du Québec (RAAV), together 
“represent all artists in Canada, as sanctioned by the Status of the Artist Act,” and 
have been lobbying the Canadian government for decades in an effort to 




42 RUPERT MYER, REPORT OF THE CONTEMPORARY VISUAL ARTS AND CRAFT INQUIRY 60 (2002). 
43 Id. at 158–59. 
44 CAN. ARTISTS’ REPRESENTATION LE FRONT DES ARTISTES CANADIENS & LE REGROUPEMENT 
DES ARTISTES EN ARTS VISUELS DU QUEBEC, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN ARTIST RESALE RIGHT IN 
CANADA 1 (2010), 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/Committee/411/CC11/WebDoc/WD5401532/403_C32_Copyright_Bri
efs%5CCanadianArtistsRepresentationE.pdf. 
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living income.”45  CARFAC’s efforts led to the passage of a 1988 amendment to 
the federal Copyright Act, “which recognizes artists as the primary producers of 
culture, and gives artists legal entitlement to public exhibition royalties.”46 
Like Australia, one of Canada’s largest concerns is the economic status of its 
own indigenous people, the Inuit.  In its lobbying efforts, CARFAC points to 
examples like the case of Inuit artist Kenojuak Ashevak, who sold a piece in 1960 
for $24, and received nothing in compensation when it was later resold for 
$58,650.47  CARFAC notes that “Canada’s Indigenous artists in particular are 
losing out on the tremendous profit being made on their work in the secondary 
market.  Many artists living in isolated northern communities live in 
impoverished conditions, while their work dramatically increases in value.”48  A 
growing sense of urgency has emerged as Canada’s art market has expanded to a 
point where “auction sales break new records every year.”49  A 2010 economic 
impact study found that an estimated $52 million is spent on Inuit art annually, 
yet the Inuit artists receive no compensation from the thriving market for their 
work.50 
Due to push back from some auction houses, however, efforts to implement a 
royalty scheme in Canada have stalled.  Stephen Ranger, vice president of the 
auction house Waddington’s, responded to CARFAC’s “confrontational tack” by 
pointing out that while in theory the artist deserves compensation for his work, 
auction houses worry about fair administration and roll-out across the industry.51  
He suggests that a possible way forward for Canada would be active cooperation 
between auction houses and CARFAC, rather than CARFAC lobbying 
unilaterally with no input from players in the industry.52  Ranger has also 
expressed skepticism that a royalty scheme would truly benefit artists, and has 
questioned whether enough art appreciates that resales constitute an actual market 
issue.53 
However, much of the data on Canada’s art market hugely undermines 
Ranger’s attempts to downplay the plight of the artist—for instance, “[i]n Canada, 
resale accounts for a staggering 98% of all auction house transactions.”54  
Canadian art industry experts argue that “[t]he security of a droit de suite would 




47 Help Bring the Artist’s Resale Right to Canada CAN. ARTISTS’ REPRESENTATION LE FRONT DES 
ARTISTES CANADIENS, http://www.carfac.ca/initiatives/help-bring-the-artists-resale-right-to-canada/ (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2017). 
48 Id. 
49 Inuit Artists to Miss Out on Resale Right Payments at Coming Auctions, CAN. ARTISTS’ 
REPRESENTATION LE FRONT DES ARTISTES CANADIENS (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.carfac.ca/news/2012/ 
11/01/inuit-artists-to-miss-out-on-resale-right-payments-at-coming-auctions/. 
50 Id. 
51 Sky Gooden, Canada’s Artists and Auction Houses Face Off in Fight over Resale Royalties, 




54 Chris Ling, Guarding the Avant-garde: The Canadian Artist’s Resale Right, OPENWIDE (Dec. 9, 
2013), http://openwidezine.com/2013/12/09/guarding-the-avant-garde-the-canadian-artists-resale-right/. 
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earn a consistent living without the need for additional sources of income.”55  
Thus, although Canada does not have a royalty scheme in place, its situation 




III. THE OUTLIERS: THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 
 
A. Droit de Suite in the United States 
 
Copyright has long been a part of American law.  The first United States 
copyright statute was passed in 1790.57  It has been revised many times in 
subsequent years, most recently and thoroughly in the Copyright Act of 1976, 
codified in U.S.C. Title 17.58  Traditionally, United States law has “focused 
exclusively on protecting economic rights”59 of the artist, giving only limited lip-
service to the notion of moral rights of the artist. 
In 1990, the United States passed the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), 
which was the first American legislation to recognize and grant protections for 
the moral rights of artists.60  It was passed in order to get the United States in 
compliance with the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works, of which the United States became a signatory March 1, 1989.61  VARA 
expanded the Copyright Act, U.S.C. Title 17, to include three moral rights of the 
artist: “(1) the right of attribution, (2) the right of integrity, and (3) the right to 
prevent destruction of works of ‘recognized stature.’”62  VARA sets the term of 
protection to be the duration of the artist’s life,63 which is notable because it is 
shorter than the standard length of copyright protection, which is the life of the 
author plus seventy years.64  The rights granted by VARA are nontransferable but 
are waivable via an express agreement to waive “in a written instrument signed 
by the author.”65  That a moral right can be waived suggests that the United States 
does not emphasize the moral aspects of artist protections as much as the 
economic aspects.  However, Congress did demonstrate some awareness of the 
economic plight of the artist in its debates over VARA, and members did express 
concern that moral rights of the artist could be waived: 
 
The Committee recognizes that these rights are personal to the 
author and that, because of a relatively weak economic position, 
 
55 Id. 
56 The impact of Australia’s royalty scheme on the art market is discussed below.  See infra Part IV. 
57 RIGHTS & REPRODUCTIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 30. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2015). 
61 RIGHTS & REPRODUCTIONS HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 33–34. 
62 RayMing Chang, Revisiting the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: A Follow-Up Survey About 
Awareness and Waiver, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 129, 134 (2004). 
63 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2015). 
64 Chang, supra note 62, at 135–136. 
65 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (2015). 
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the author may be required to bargain away those rights.  It also 
recognizes that routine waivers of the rights will eviscerate the 
law. On the other hand, the Committee believes that to proscribe 
waiver would be to inhibit normal commercial practices.66 
 
In spite of VARA and the discussion it inspired, the United States has not 
implemented a national artist resale royalty scheme.  In 2014 the American 
Royalties Too Act was introduced in Congress but ultimately failed to pass.67  Its 
proposed terms would have imposed a five percent royalty rate on public sales of 
$5,000 or more, capping the maximum royalty at $35,000.68  Sotheby’s and 
Christie’s, two of the largest auction houses in the world, allegedly spent more 
than $1 million in lobbying efforts against the bill.69  
 The United States does have one lone standout in terms of droit de suite, 
however—California.  The state of California is the only jurisdiction in the 
United States to have a royalty scheme, and it has been the source of considerable 
controversy.70  Under the California Resale Royalty Act of 1976 (CRRA), artists 
have a right to receive a five percent royalty on any resale of their artwork valued 
at $1,000 or more—unless the artist expressly waives the right to receive a 
royalty via contract.71  The protection “continues for the life of the artist plus 20 
years.”72 
The CRRA (and subsequent federal legislative attempts) came into being due 
to the story of one particular artist, Robert Rauschenberg, much as the original 
French droit de suite was famously inspired by the story of Jean-Francois 
Millet.73  Rauschenberg originally sold his 1958 painting Thaw for $900, only for 
the painting to be resold at auction some years later for $85,000.74  Furious that he 
and other artists in similar positions never saw any benefit from the appreciation 
in value of their works, Rauschenberg “vigorously campaign[ed] for resale 
royalty rights for artists” in the United States.75 
 The CRRA has been controversial, however, because it imposes the royalty 
scheme not only upon in-state auctions, but also upon out-of-state auctions if the 
seller is based in California.76  Recently, artists Chuck Close and Laddie John Dill 
and the estate of Robert Graham “filed a lawsuit against Christie’s and Sotheby’s 
 
66 Chang, supra note 62, at 138 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101–514 at 18 (1990)). 




70 Judith B. Prowda, Assessing Artist’s Resale Rights Legislation, N.Y. L.J. (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202539351744/Assessing-Artists-Resale-Rights-
Legislation?slreturn=20150911180833. 
71 CAL. CIV. CODE § 986. 
72 Prowda, supra note 70. 
73 Morgan & Purje, supra note 5. 
74 Diana Wierbicki, Is Global Trend on Artist Resale Royalties Right for U.S.?, LAW360 (Mar. 7, 
2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/515958/is-global-trend-on-artist-resale-royalties-right-for-us. 
75 Id. 
76 CAL. CIV. CODE § 986(a). 
2017 Schten: No More Starving Artists 125 
 
demanding resale royalties from past auctions.”77  The Ninth Circuit found the 
CRRA partially unconstitutional, holding that “the provision regulating out-of-
state sales violates the dormant Commerce Clause but that the provision is 
severable from the remainder of the Act.”78  Thus the CRRA remains effective for 
public art sales taking place within the state, even though the Ninth Circuit 
limited its scope.  Proponents of a national royalty scheme have largely viewed 
this result as positive foreshadowing, in that the Ninth Circuit did not strike the 
substantive provisions of the CRRA granting artists much greater moral rights 
and protections than granted by federal law.79 
Despite the failure of the 2014 American Royalties Too Act, the federal 
government has recently made some pronouncements that suggest a national 
royalty scheme may not be too far-fetched.  In December 2013, the United States 
Copyright Office published an adjunct to a 1992 report published by the 
Copyright Office entitled Droit de Suite: The Artist’s Resale Royalty.  Published 
within the 2013 report was a letter from Register of Copyrights Director Maria 
Pallante to Congressman Jerrod Nadler, one of the sponsors of the 2014 American 
Royalties Too Act.  Pallante summarized the conclusions reached by the 
Copyright Office in the 2013 report: 
 
[T]he Office has concluded that certain visual artists may 
operate at a disadvantage under the copyright law relative to 
authors of other types of creative works.  Visual artists typically 
do not share in the long-term financial success of their works 
because works of visual art are produced singularly and valued 
for their scarcity, unlike books, films, and songs, which are 
produced and distributed in multiple copies to consumers.  
Consequently, in many, if not most instances, only the initial 
sale of a work of visual art inures to the benefit of the artist and 
it is collectors and other purchasers who reap any increase in 
that work’s value over time.  Today more than seventy foreign 
countries—twice as many as in 1992—have enacted a resale 
royalty provision of some sort to address this perceived 
inequality.80 
 
Unpacking this statement reveals quite a lot about the state of United States 
law regarding droit de suite.  First, it shows an acceptance of the inequality and 
inadequacy of current protections for artists.  Second, it clearly and unequivocally 
points out to Congress the distinction between visual artists and other artists 
which demands federal intervention.  And lastly, it draws attention to how far 
behind the United States is from the rest of the world on this issue.  Perhaps, as 
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with VARA, the United States needs the urgency of complying with an 
international agreement to finally take comprehensive action. 
 
B. Droit de Suite in China 
 
Understanding the Chinese art market is an endeavor unto itself.  First and 
foremost, the market has “grown tremendously over the past few years.”81  In 
2012, it posted $14 billion in sales, making it second only to the United States in 
size.82  It accounts for more than twenty-five percent of international auction 
revenues.83 
Thus, the typical narrative of an artist selling for a low price early in his 
career only to see his work later resold for a much higher value has been 
occurring extremely frequently.  One author has noted how the resale problem has 
manifested itself much more quickly and drastically in the Chinese market than it 
did in Western markets, observing: 
 
It is a story that is common across the art world, and in particular 
in the contemporary Asian market, which has developed at a 
meteoric pace in recent years compared to mature Western 
markets.  Even for established midcareer artists, the secondary 
market prices now quickly outrun those on the primary market.  
This leaves both the artist and gallery in something of a 
dilemma:  if they “chase” the auction prices for sales of new 
works, they risk unsustainable prices and ultimately a ruined 
career.  If they do nothing, the sense of frustration at money “left 
on the table” can demotivate artists and strain relationships 
between artist and gallery.84 
 
China, like the United States, does not have an artist resale royalty scheme.  
But in light of descriptions of the state of its art market, imposing a royalty 
scheme to protect the moral and economic rights of the artist seems almost 
imperative just for the sake of controlling a potential bubble in the market, not to 
mention for the benefit of the artists themselves. 
Complicating things, of course, are the auction houses—namely, the Poly 
Group, a “$40 billion state-owned enterprise” which “oversees activities ranging 
from arms dealing” to art auctions.85  Since its first foray into art auctions in 
2005, the Poly Group has become the world’s third largest auction house, after 
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only Christie’s and Sotheby’s.86  While China has not entertained any notion of 
imposing a royalty scheme, any contemplation of such an act must undoubtedly 
consider the role of such a powerful player, especially in light of Christie’s and 
Sotheby’s success in stalling royalty legislation in the United States.  That the 
Poly Group is also state-owned throws a further wrench into the works.  
Therefore, while the United States for all its reluctance seems at least open to 
implementing a royalty scheme, China has not even begun the process of 
considering it—something any international effort to harmonize royalty schemes 
must keep in mind. 
 
 
IV. ARTIST RESALE ROYALTY SCHEMES IN PRACTICE AND THEIR DISPARATE 
IMPACT ON THE INTERNATIONAL ART MARKET 
 
A. Criticisms of Droit de Suite 
 
Criticisms of droit de suite are plenty and of varying credibility.  Three of the 
most legitimate concerns involve the administrative burden of implementing the 
scheme and insuring meaningful compliance, questions over whether droit de 
suite actually accomplishes what it seeks to achieve, and lastly whether droit de 
suite runs contrary to widely accepted understandings of certain legal principles. 
Administrative burden includes the effort to actually set up the law and make 
all parties in the art market aware of its existence and its process.  It also includes 
the equally important effort of ensuring that all parties comply, a difficult task in 
the notoriously murky art market.  Enforcement of any such regulation must 
overcome “the wall of silence that surrounds the art market.”87  Uneven 
enforcement of royalty schemes across different countries could result in the same 
problems that exist with the current piecemeal implementation of droit de suite.  
If one country tightly regulates the process, and another is more relaxed in 
insuring compliance with paying the royalty, then sales may move into those 
countries where paying the royalty is, in effect, optional due to poor enforcement. 
This post-implementation effect, which probably represents the most 
significant barrier to achieving effective international droit de suite, tends to take 
the backseat in discussions surrounding initial implementation, however.  
Countries considering implementing a royalty scheme worry more about the day-
to-day impact of regulating a difficult and complex market.  These concerns were 
summarized by John Robertson, a former commercial art gallery manager in 
London, who noted that figuring out and consistently applying the letter of the 
law “involved a great deal of time if not money.  ‘Most of my contemporary art 
transactions were at the level of 1,000 to 3,000 pounds. . . . Paying 4 percent on 
that amount wasn’t as much the problem as the time it would take to do 
everything the law requires. . . .’”88  Robertson estimated that he handled 400 to 
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500 such sales annually; at that scale, compliance could certainly become a 
headache. 
These problems are not insurmountable.  Functioning administrative schemes 
already exist and could serve as models for countries to build their own upon.  
For example, the U.K. requires royalties to be collected by a collecting society.  
Many of these organizations, such as the Design and Artist Copyright Society 
(DACS) and the Artist Collecting Society (ACS) already exist for the purpose of 
keeping track of artists and their estates for copyright reasons, and also “collect 
[artist resale royalties] on behalf of registered members.”89  These organizations 
take some of the regulatory burden off of the shoulders of the government, and 
seem to have found some success; for example, “DACS paid out over £14 million 
($22.5 million) in royalties to 19,000 artists and estates in 2013” alone.90 
Basically, the parties making transactions fear expending disproportionate 
resources on the difficult process of tracking and locating artists in order to 
distribute the royalty.  But they need not worry, because that is precisely the focus 
of collecting agencies.  “When DACS is notified of a royalty arising from a sale 
of art work by an artist who is not represented by DACS, or another collecting 
society, we will seek to collect the royalty and find the artist, or their heirs, in 
order to distribute the royalty to them.”91 
Additionally, royalty schemes serve to increase transparency in the art 
market, rather than exacerbate its pervasive “secrecy norms.”92  By attaching 
payment to resales of a work of art, royalties also attach “recognition of [the 
artist’s] continuing link to their work as well as providing a measure of 
transparency as to its destination and ownership.”93  Thus, auction houses and 
galleries could no longer rely on anonymous seller and purchasers and 
questionable provenance; the necessity of securing royalty payment and 
distributing it to the artist would implicitly create a visible trail of purchase.  This 
benefit has been acknowledged by the International Confederation of Authors and 
Composers Societies (CISAC) and many at the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO):  “[T]he resale right also maintains the essential link 
between the creator and their work.  It enables the visual artist to follow their 
work.”94  And in doing so, it allows parties in the market to follow the work as 
well. 
Other critics question whether royalty schemes actually achieve their purpose 
of improving the plight of “starving artists.”  Several studies seem to suggest that 
the royalties do little for the underdogs, and instead distribute royalties mostly to 
relatively famous artists with established resale markets, like Picasso and 
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Matisse.95  “A 2010 report on artists’ resale royalties, commissioned by the 
European Art Market coalition, found that in continental Europe, 74 percent of all 
royalties collected went to artists’ heirs, 20 percent to the collecting agencies, and 
only 6 percent to living artists.”96  And a study conducted by the Intellectual 
Property Institute of the University of Southern California School of Law “found 
that most payments to artists ‘are quite small and the median payment to artists 
based on auction house data is 256 pounds.’”97  In a study prepared for the 2015 
International Literary and Artistic Association (ALAI) colloquium, law professor 
Sam Ricketson admitted that resale royalty rights are indeed “open to the 
objection that sums collected tend to be relatively small and concentrated among 
a narrow band of artists and their descendants.”98 
Fortunately, the reality differs from this bleak picture.  The international 
consensus agrees that overall, royalty schemes do help a wide range of artists.  
More recent studies demonstrate a much more encouraging prognosis for resale 
rights.  “While the sums collected may still be relatively modest, they are not 
insignificant and their distribution is becoming more widely dispersed among 
living artists.”99  At the same ALAI colloquium, Ricketson concluded these types 
of objections—that royalty schemes do not do enough to help the actually-
disadvantaged artists—are not unique to the payment of visual artists, and present 
merely a straw-man argument against droit de suite: 
 
None of the above objections, however, is peculiar to [the Resale 
Royalty Right], or rather they apply just as readily in the case of 
any of the other exclusive rights accorded to authors, whether 
these be rights of reproduction, public performance, or 
communication, or moral rights.  Authors’ rights generally 
provide no guarantee of return to the other or that these returns 
will be equitably shared.  At most, they provide the promise of 
return, subject to the vagaries of public taste and need.100 
 
As an organization directly involved in the distribution side of droit de suite, 
statistics offered by DACS also undermine the notion that resales only benefit the 
estates of already-famous artists:  “[L]iving artists received 57% percent of fees 
in 2014, compared with 43% going to artists [sic] estate. . . . Over half of artists 
and estates paid in 2014 received less than £500, suggesting that the scheme ‘does 
not only benefit artists whose work sells for a lot of money.’”101 
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Furthermore, royalty schemes give agency to artists, a group otherwise at 
severe bargaining disadvantage against the extreme wealth and influence of 
auction houses, galleries, private collectors, and museums.  In a stunning reversal 
of its historical position on the matter, the United States Copyright Office recently 
embraced the idea of droit de suite, acknowledging the imbalance in bargaining 
power inherent to the art market.  Writing in a December 2013 report, it 
expressed support of resale royalties “as one option to address the historic 
imbalance in the treatment of visual artists. . . . Given most artist’s comparative 
lack of bargaining power[,] . . . some level of congressional involvement may be 
necessary for these negotiations to achieve meaningful results.”102 
Lastly, some critics contend that droit de suite violates traditional principles 
of alienability of property and contradicts copyright law doctrine.103  Before 
engaging too much with these contentions, it is imperative to clarify that art does 
not abide by many of the rules of property.  Art complicates or even defies basic 
property law concepts because each work is a unique object, and the entire history 
of art transactions is dominated by theft and looting, dating back to Roman times, 
making issues of good-faith purchaser, conversion, replevin, and so on. 
impossible to answer.104  Plenty has been written about these concepts, and to 
focus on them too much would distract from the focus of this article.  The 
important thing, however, is that imposing a resale royalty right no more violates 
the notion of alienability of property than a sales tax.  Pilar Ordovas, the former 
head of Christie’s contemporary art department in London and now a gallery 
owner, explained that prior to the U.K. implementation of droit de suite, “the 
auction house conducted a ‘study of comparative taxes in the United States, such 
as the New York City sales tax, which is pretty comparable to the artist resale 
royalty, which suggested that the impact would be pretty minimal.’  Her own 
experience is that the ‘law hasn’t really changed things. At most, it is a cost 
absorbed by the dealer.’”105  That is to say, droit de suite is no more incompatible 
with the art market than sales taxes are incompatible with economies in general. 
 
B. Evaluating the Effects of Existing Droit de Suite Schemes on their Domestic 
Art Markets 
 
Perhaps the loudest concern with implementing droit de suite laws involves 
the potential for an additional cost of transaction to damage sales by imposing an 
additional transaction cost on top of existing transactions costs such as research 
“to verify titling, authenticity, attribution,” and so on.106  Rather surprisingly, 
much of the worry comes from the United States, one of the few significant art 
markets left without a royalty scheme.  California, however, has had a 
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controversial royalty scheme in place since 1976,107 which has been both a 
helpful and harmful illustration for understanding how a royalty scheme affects 
the art market. 
The example of California and the rest of the United States represents on a 
small-scale what some critics fear could play out in the larger international 
market should adoption of droit de suite continue to be so piecemeal.  Though 
California adopted the artist resale right in 1976, a recent federal case has inspired 
a new wave of concern over the distorting effects that a non-universal royalty 
scheme imposes on the broader market, resulting in sensationalist headlines such 
as 9th Circ. Royalty Case to Drive Art Resales Out of Calif.108  The Ninth Circuit 
overturned part of an earlier decision that had held the entire act unconstitutional, 
due to violating the commerce clause.  But on appeal, the court found that the 
provision requiring out-of-state sales was severable from the rest of the act, and 
“upheld the requirement that fine-art sellers must pay royalties to artists on sales 
that occur in California.”109 
Experts warned that the California art market would plummet:  “No other 
state has a resale royalty law, so galleries outside of California will be able to sell 
works of art for five percent less than could a California gallery. . . . Or owners 
could accept five percent less if they want their art sold in a California gallery.”110  
Whether or not such a reduction in the resale market actually occurred remains 
open to debate:  “[T]here have been very few studies on the impact of the 
CRAA. . . . Nevertheless, Sotheby’s refused to conduct contemporary art auctions 
in Los Angeles after the enactment of the CRAA.”111  Reports have also noted 
that, since the adoption of the CRRA, “only 400 artists have received a royalty for 
a total of $328,000.”112 
This example illuminates two keys to understanding the ways in which artist 
resale rights encourage or discourage sales in particular areas.  First, piecemeal 
implementation of droit de suite does, even if only to a small extent, distorts the 
market.  Players prefer to deal in locations with low transaction costs, including 
low administrative burdens and lower costs, even if both of those things are 
negligible in the grand scheme of the art trade.  The way to overcome this 
problem is to implement droit de suite universally, making those transaction costs 
an intrinsic and inescapable part of art dealing.  Second, the California example 
reveals compliance issues; that is, artists or their estate are frequently difficult to 
track down, and thus galleries would be forced to expend disproportionate 
resources on what should be a routine part of a transaction.  However, as 
implementation of droit de suite in the U.K. has made clear, this is a hurdle that is 
easily overcome. 
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The U.K. provides a more optimistic picture, but much of that is tied to the 
U.K.’s relationship to the larger E.U. market, which has a harmonized royalty 
scheme.  E.U. harmonization was motivated in part by concerns similar to those 
held in the United States with regard to California and market distortions.  The 
E.U. fully acknowledged that without harmonization, there existed a real 
possibility that art sales would simply move to royalty-free states.113  The lesson 
of California and the United States, therefore, could only be a valuable 
condemnation of droit de suite if all the States were similarly harmonized under a 
baseline royalty scheme. 
As it stands, the success of the U.K. within the E.U. royalty scheme bodes 
well for international implementation of a universal royalty scheme.  Director of 
London’s Victoria Miro Gallery Glenn Scott-Wright reported that “[s]ales have 
been as healthy as before the law came into effect. . . . Clients haven’t indicated 
they were unwilling to buy because of the royalty.”114  The law, once in effect, 
has been non-controversial, even though its implementation was a struggle.115  
Scott-Wright’s experience is not merely anecdotal, but is in line with what the 
British auction houses have observed as well.116 
Australia has also found some success with its recent droit de scheme law.  
Although it has only been in effect since 2010 “and has been restricted to resales 
of works . . . acquired after the commencement of the scheme,” from June 2010 to 
May 2013, “there have been 6,801 eligible resales that have generated over $1.5 
million in royalties for 650 artists.”117 
 
C. Speculating on the Effects of Droit de Suite on the International Art Market 
 
These examples of positive effects in the domestic art markets of countries 
with droit de suite could be undermined if the net effect on the international 
market was resoundingly negative.  As hinted at in evaluations of royalty 
schemes’ effects on their domestic art markets, the most pressing concern for 
international implementation involves the potential for distortion of the world 
market.  While universal implementation seems to be the solution, it does not fix 
some of the inherent problems of royalty schemes.  Echoing the concern about 
difficulties with enforcement, compliance must be equally universal, or else 
market distortions may persist.  For example, even in a world where every 
country imposes some minimal royalty scheme, dealers may flock to countries 
that do little to enforce it, recreating the same tensions that currently exist 
between states that do and do not have royalty schemes.  Perversely, countries 
may be incentivized toward lax enforcement, in an effort to attract resales.  Any 
international agreement on the subject of droit de suite must address compliance 
and enforcement as well as the right and rate structure itself. 
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Some studies suggest that strict compliance may not be such a force in 
driving sales away; for example, “there is no evidence that [resale royalties have] 
diverted business away from the U.K., where the size of the art market has grown 
as fast, if not faster, than the art market in jurisdictions where [resale royalties 
are] not currently payable.”118  Sarah Percy Davis, chief executive of the 
Association of Art & Antique Dealers in London, has stated that any damage to 
the E.U. art market has been “negligible,” describing it as “more theoretical than 
actual.”119  Market distortion—that is, the flow of sales out of the E.U. and into 
non-royalty countries—has also been negligible.  “Following implementation of 
resale royalty laws in the European Union, the European Union found little 
evidence that prices in the primary art market in Europe decreased or that the 
secondary resale market was shifted to countries without resale royalty laws, such 
as Switzerland or China.”120 
The most important impact of droit de suite on the international art market 
involves setting an overall global balance and addressing reciprocity concerns.  
Establishing a universal baseline would “[go] some distance towards correcting 
the imbalance that otherwise exists between the rights of visual artists and those 
enjoyed by other categories of authors. . . . Global adoption would also offset the 
disparities that creators face when their works are sold in countries that do not 
recognize the resale right.”121  This touches on an issue reminiscent of the cascade 
effect.  Say, for example, that an artist lives in country X, which does not have a 
resale royalty right.  One of the artist’s works is sold at public auction in country 
Y, which does have a resale royalty right.  The way the law functions now, the 
artist is not entitled to any resale royalty, even though his work was sold in a 
country that protects such a right.  This is the reciprocity problem. 
Marie-Anne Ferry-Fall, Director General of the Société des Auteurs dans les 
Arts graphiques et plastiques (ADAGP), stated at a WIPO session in October 
2015 that “[t]he Resale Right operates on a reciprocity condition so is only 
granted to the artist when their country recognizes it—this creates a huge 
imbalance between authors globally.”122  The reciprocity problem, above all, is 
why droit de suite cannot continue to be implemented at whim by individual 
countries, but should be addressed in a universally applicable international 
agreement aiming to even out the playing field.  As artist Gordon Cheung has 
pointed out, “So many sales take place in countries that don’t recognize the right, 
such as the United States or China.  This unfairly disadvantages artists based in 
these countries, as well as artists whose work sells in other countries.”123 
A global mandate for droit de suite would go a long way in providing a 
solution.  Universal adoption would also ameliorate possible market distortions 
(provided, as discussed above, that enforcement and compliance are equally 
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prioritized).  Leaders in the legal industry seem to be arriving at the same 
conclusion:  “[I]ncreasing voices within WIPO . . . believe this topic should be 
placed on the agenda of the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related 
Rights.  Our goal is simply to ensure that wherever they are in the world, all 
visual artists get the same fair share in the success of their works.”124  
Establishing a baseline resale royalty right is also of special importance in an age 
of rapid globalization and ease of trading art across borders.  At the June 2015 
session at the WIPO in Geneva, Hervé di Rosa, artist, vice-president of ADAGP, 
and chair of the International Council of Creators of Graphic, Plastic, and 
Photographic Arts (CIAGP), expressed frustration at “how an artist justly 
benefitting from a sale in one territory but being denied his right in another is 
entirely contradictory to the realities of the global art market that exists today.”125  
Harmonization has become the international consensus; the next question is how 
to achieve it. 
 
 
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORMS 
 
 
The first step towards implementing a global visual artist resale royalty 
scheme requires choosing the instrument to do so.  Two reasonable possibilities 
exist:  an amendment to the already extant right within the Berne Convention, or a 
new multilateral treaty. 
Amending the Berne Convention appears at first glance to be the simplest 
and most effective answer.  Since 1948, droit de suite has been enshrined in 
Article 14ter (“Droit de Suite in Works of Art and Manuscripts”) of the Berne 
Convention. It includes three provisions establishing the existence of the right, 
defining it as “inalienable,” and making clear that it was not mandatory, but 
optional—that is, no artist had the right to invoke it unless droit de suite had been 
adopted by legislation in their country.126 
Thus, it seems logical to simply amend the Berne Convention to make the 
right mandatory rather than optional.  However, this is simply not a feasible 
option due to the particularities of the Convention’s amendment process.  Articles 
26 and 27, governing amendments and revisions respectively, require that three-
fourths of the members of the Assembly vote to adopt the amendment.127  For a 
revision to be successfully adopted, there must be “unanimity of the votes cast” 
among those members.128  Industry experts, such as ADAGP, recognize the 
“difficulty” of such a process.129  However, even if the voting members agree 
unanimously on an amendment making Article 14ter mandatory, “[r]evisions . . . 
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have been typically directed at revision of the Convention as a whole, rather than 
just one provision, while a further factor that has made revisions impossible in 
recent years has been the fault lines that have emerged between developed and 
developing countries.”130  Thus, for amendment to the Berne Convention to be 
feasible, three fourths of its members would have to agree to a vote, that vote 
would have to be unanimous, and the revision would have to be packaged with 
other proposed revisions that survived the same amendment adoption process.  
On top of all that, the rift between developed and developing countries would 
have to suddenly resolve itself, even though it has been creating significant 
problems for the Convention since 1967.131 
That does not mean that Berne cannot provide some guidance for how to 
proceed. Article 19 provides that “[t]he provisions of this Convention shall not 
preclude the making of a claim to the benefit of any greater protection which may 
be granted by legislation in a country of the Union.”132  The resale royalty right 
“is readily susceptible to treatment under a separate international agreement 
consistently with the requirements of Article 19 of the Berne Convention. . . . 
This has already occurred in the area of public communication and other rights 
under the WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996 . . . .”133  In light of the provisions of the 
Berne Convention, a new treaty appears to be the most viable means of 
harmonizing droit de suite globally. 
The idea of a multilateral droit de suite treaty already has notable 
international support.  “The issue was officially added to [WIPO’s] agenda on 3 
July 2015—a significant first step towards negotiating a global treaty.  China, 
Iran, Sudan, Kenya and Tanzania, none of which currently has legislation, voiced 
support for the adoption of royalty rights.”134  Other countries who have passed 
legislation, such as Senegal, Ivory Coast, Brazil, and the members of the EU, 
likewise “backed a universal solution.”135  ADAGP concurs that “a mandatory 
instrument (a treaty) is necessary.”136 
The next question, naturally, is what such a treaty might look like.  First, 
treaties do not automatically establish laws in the nations of their signatories. In 
this situation, a treaty would bind each signatory to enact its own national 
legislation on the subject. A treaty would also set baselines, minimums, and 
certain features that each state’s national legislation should contain.  In a study for 
a proposed international droit de suite treaty produced for CISAC, law professor 
Sam Ricketson laid out a comprehensive model treaty.137  Some of the provisions 
proposed there should certainly be part of any discussion of a potential treaty. 
First, there must be reassurance of the inalienability of the right.138  
Inalienability of the right means that artists cannot sell or waive their right to 
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receive a resale royalty.  This is an important measure due to the disadvantaged 
position of bargaining power of artists in the market compared to industry giants 
such as auction houses, etc.  Inalienability derives from the personhood theory of 
copyright law, “which suggests that the creator of a work never really gives up all 
of the property interests in the work, as it is actually part of the creator’s 
personhood.”139  This feature of the right should extend to the artist’s estate for 
similar reasons; “it appears logical that it should be held by the nominated 
successors of the author and not become a tradable commodity:  this is at least 
consistent with the traditional justifications of [resale royalty rights] as being for 
the benefit of the author’s impecunious heirs.”140  Thus, inalienability must be 
retained as a baseline in any attempt at harmonization in order for the purposes of 
droit de suite to be achieved—that is, protection of the artist’s right in his own 
work. 
Next, any multilateral treaty must provide adequate definitions.  For example, 
“artist” must be defined, and such definition must clarify confusion about things 
like “artist-patron” or “artist-team” relationships.  Furthermore, estate questions 
must be addressed; that is, if an artist passes his estate not to his family but to a 
foundation or charity, are those organizations eligible to collect the resale royalty 
proceeds?  What constitutes an “artwork” must also be defined, as must what 
constitutes a “sale,” especially in light of the rise of online art trading.  
Furthermore, it would be prudent to set if not a minimal rate, at the very least a 
range of permissible rates that countries may set in their national legislation.  And 
lastly, a treaty should decide whether to follow the U.K. model or not—that is, 
determining whether artists or their estates should collect the royalty proceeds 
from resales directly, or whether they should be collected and distributed by artist 
societies such as DACS and ACS. 
These possible provisions provide plenty of room for disagreement, and 
enacting a multilateral treaty would certainly be a project of enormous scope.  
However, considering the global trend towards adoption of droit de suite, and the 
need to smooth over market distortions caused by piecemeal implementation, it is 






The concept of droit de suite caught political attention with the plight of 
Jean-Francois Millet in nineteenth-century France and has continued to gain 
traction over the years, especially in the most recent few decades.  Over eighty 
countries have passed some form of national legislation securing the right of the 
visual artist to earn a royalty on resale of his original artwork, including large 
players in the art market such as the E.U. and Australia. 
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Yet, there are notable outliers, including China and the United States, who 
represent the second and third largest art markets in the world, respectively.  This 
uneven application of droit de suite led some industry experts to fear distortion in 
the global market that artificially encourages more sales in royalty-free states 
while discouraging resales in states with royalty schemes in place.  Although this 
phenomenon has not occurred in any meaningful capacity, it draws attention to 
other imbalances that persist in the global art market due to inconsistency 
between states that do and do not possess royalty schemes.  Reciprocity is one of 
the most important such issues, in that artists may be shut out from benefitting 
from the resales of their works if their country of residence has no droit de suite 
law in effect, even if the sale took place in a jurisdiction that did have a royalty 
scheme. 
Therefore, the international community should consider a multilateral treaty 
in the context of Article 19 of the Berne Convention.  This treaty should seek to 
provide baseline protections for artists, including establishing the inalienability of 
droit de suite and mandating that signatories implement their own national resale 
royalty schemes, taking into account agreed-upon minimum terms in the treaty.  
In this way, artists can be given more of a chance to earn reasonable income for 
their life’s work, while the global art market can carry on its multi-billion dollar 
enterprise with more transparency and consistency. 
 
 
 
 
